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LOGIC FOR EXACT ENTAILMENT
KIT FINE AND MARK JAGO
Abstract. An exact truthmaker for A is a state which, as well as guaranteeing A’s
truth, is wholly relevant to it. States with parts irrelevant to whether A is true do not
count as exact truthmakers for A. Giving semantics in this way produces a very unusual
consequence relation, on which conjunctions do not entail their conjuncts. This feature
makes the resulting logic highly unusual. In this paper, we set out formal semantics for
exact truthmaking and characterise the resulting notion of entailment, showing that it
is compact and decidable. We then investigate the effect of various restrictions on the
semantics. We also formulate a sequent-style proof system for exact entailment and give
soundness and completeness results.
§1. Introduction. There are a number of different ways in which a state or
fact can be said to be a truthmaker for a sentence. It can simply necessitate the
sentence; or it can necessitate the sentence while being partially relevant to its
truth; or it can necessitate the sentence while being wholly relevant to its truth.
Our interest in the present paper is in the third, exact, mode of truthmaking.
The notion of exact truthmaking has lately been applied to a number of differ-
ent topics in philosophy and linguistics [Fine, 2017] and it has natural affinities
with the notion of ground in metaphysics. Given the significance of the notion, it
is therefore of interest to determine the logic to which it gives rise. If truthmak-
ing is taken to be wholly relevant, as on the exact model, rather than simply a
matter of necessitation, as on the classical model, then what will be the resulting
notion of entailment and how will it behave?
It turns out that this question is not altogether unambiguous. When we have
the entailment of one formula by another, we may simply say that the one for-
mula A exactly entails the other C when every exact truthmaker for A is an exact
truthmaker for C. But when several formulas A1, A2, . . . are taken to entail an-
other C, there are two different ways in which we might proceed. We might say,
on a distributive reading, that every truthmaker for each of A1, A2, . . . should be
a truthmaker for C; or we might say, on a collective reading, that every truth-
maker for the conjunction A1 ^ A2 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ of A1, A2, . . . should be a truthmaker
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The paper arose in the following way. Mark Jago initially wrote a paper on the topic. This
contained the characterisation theorem, but proved in a somewhat complicated way. He later
learned of Kit Fine’s related unpublished work on the collective notion of exact entailment; and
they decided to join forces, thereby extending some of their previous results and simplifying
some of the proofs.
1
2 KIT FINE AND MARK JAGO
for C. These two notions of entailment will coincide in the classical case but
not in the exact case. For A,B will exactly entail A in the distributive sense of
entailment but not in the collective sense, since there is, in general, no guarantee
that an exact truthmaker for A^B will be an exact truthmaker for A. Since A
entails A (in either sense), the collective sense of entailment, in contrast to the
distributive sense, will not be monotonic.
The present paper focuses on the first, distributive, sense of exact entailment
and is largely concerned with the special problems which arise when the same
state is taken to be a truthmaker for different formulas. These problems are
partly proof theoretic in character, since we are no longer entitled to infer from
the fact that A,B exactly entails C that A^B exactly entails C. But they are
also partly semantic, since it is not altogether clear what is required of a state
when it is taken to be a truthmaker for two different formulas, such as A ^ B
and B ^ C.
One philosophical motivation for this distributive, truthmaker-sharing notion
of entailment comes from multiple realizability, as in the philosophy of mind.
Suppose mental statement M has both physical and non-physical possible real-
izers, but we want to focus on its physical realizers. These are the states which
are truthmakers for both M and the statement P that there exist physical states
(or, if you prefer, the infinite disjunction of all physical statements). We can
conceptualise P as a condition on realizers for M and investigate the exact con-
sequences of P and M , taken as distributive premises. Similar examples arise
with determinable properties and conditions on their determinates.
A different kind of use arises in the investigation of trivial truth, where a truth
is trivial in the sense that it requires nothing substantive to make it true (or,
as we prefer to say, when it is made true by the null state). It is plausible, for
example, that A Ñ A is trivial in this sense, whereas A ^  A is not. For the
latter in general requires something substantive to make it true: a substantive
truthmaker either for A or for A; whereas AÑ A requires not even that. We can
introduce a constant J, by definition made true by every state, and investigate
the consequences of distributive premises A and J. If K (by definition made true
by no state) is not a consequence, then A is a trivial truth in the intended sense.
(We do not investigate Ñ, J, or K further in this paper.)
However, our interest in the distributive notion of entailment is as much due
to logical as to philosophical curiosity. The single-premise notion of exact en-
tailment is already of great interest and so the question arises as to how should
it be extended to the multi-premise case. If one holds that the logical notion
of entailment should be monotonic in its premises, then the distributive notion
presents itself as the obvious choice.
A rough outline of the paper is as follows. §2 presents the basic semantic
framework and defines the relevant notions of exact truthmaking and exact en-
tailment. §3 defines ‘selections’, the syntactic counterparts of truthmakers, and
introduces the corresponding notion of a canonical model. §4 is central to the
whole paper; it gives a characterisation of exact entailment in terms of selections.
Of perhaps special interest is the method of proof, which depends upon defining
a congruence on a canonical model, in something like the same way in which
‘filtrations’ are defined in modal logic. §5 applies the characterisation result to
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establish decidability and compactness. §6 and §7 consider various further con-
straints that might be imposed on our models, and investigate the question of
whether these further constraints result in any changes to the logic. §8 presents
a sequent calculus, which is somewhat more complicated than usual, since A,B
on the left of a sequent cannot be interpreted conjunctively. We therefore re-
quire two ‘structural’ connectives, one interpreted distributively and the other
conjunctively. Finally, §9 establishes soundness and completeness for the system,
and the eliminability of (cut).
§2. Exact Truthmaker Semantics. It is characteristic of exact truthmak-
ing that truthmakers for a conjunction are not in general truthmakers for its
conjuncts. A truthmaker for A ^ B is the fusion of a truthmaker for A and a
truthmaker for B. We here have in mind the usual mereological notion of fusion,
according to which a fusion is a structureless whole formed from its component
parts [Varzi, 2016]. Writing s\ t for the fusion of s and t, we thus have:
s truthmakes A^B if and only if, for some t, u where t truthmakes A and
u truthmakes B, s “ t\ u.
This is, in essence, van Fraassen’s clause for conjunction [van Fraassen, 1969,
484].
What should we say about disjunctions? A disjunction is made true by what-
ever makes at least one of its disjuncts true, so we might say:
s truthmakes A _ B if and only if either s truthmakes A or s truthmakes
B.
However, this seems to exclude a further way of making a disjunction true,
namely, by being made up of parts which individually make the disjuncts true.
After all, the state of affairs that Anna is walking and Bec is sitting is wholly
relevant to the truth of ‘Anna is walking or Bec is sitting’, even if it is overkill.
So we may instead say:
s truthmakes A _ B if and only if s truthmakes A, s truthmakes B, or
s “ t\ u for some truthmakers t for A and u for B.
On the latter conception (though not on the former), truthmakers for A ^ B
are also truthmakers for A _ B, and so (if we define entailment as truthmaker-
preservation) A^B will entail A_B. To keep things simple, we will adopt the
latter clause for disjunctions here. Nevertheless, all of the results that follow will
go through if we adopt the former, under a suitable modification of definition
3.2 in §3.
We have said what the truthmakers for conjunctions and disjunctions are, so
we now need to say something about their falsemakers too. But this is straight-
forward. A falsemaker for A^B is something which falsemakes A, or B, or else is
the fusion of such falsemakers; a falsemaker for A_B is a fusion of a falsemaker
for A and a falsemaker for B; and a falsemaker for  A is a truthmaker for A
(while a truthmaker for  A is a falsemaker for A).
Having given an overview of our semantics, it is time to make it more precise.
Definition 2.1 (Syntax). Let P be a set of sentence letters. The language L
is then the smallest set containing P closed under 1-place  and 2-place ^ and
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_. Λ is the set of literals over P, i.e. PYt p : p P Pu. Let ďL be any total order
on L. We define ŹtA1, . . . , Anu “ pA1 ^ pA2 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^ Anq ¨ ¨ ¨ q, where Ai ďL Aj
iff i ď j. (We shall see below that ^ is commutative and associative, and so
brackets and order of conjuncts is semantically irrelevant.)
We take P (and hence L and Λ) to be fixed throughout.
Definition 2.2 (Frames and models). Frames are structures xS,Ďy where S
is a set of entities (states) and Ď is a partial order (reflexive, transitive, and anti-
symmetric), such that each pair s, t P S has a least upper bound in S, denoted
s\ t. An exact truthmaking model is a structure xS,Ď, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y where xS,Ďy
is a frame and | ¨ |` and | ¨ |´ are valuation functions from sentence letters P to
2S , closed under \: if s, t P |p|` then s\ t P |p|`, and similarly for |p|´.
Definition 2.3 (Exact truthmaking and falsemaking). Given a exact truth-
making model M “ xS,Ď, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y (which we leave implicit), exact truthmak-
ing , and exact falsemaking - relations are then defined by double recursion as
follows:
s , p iff s P |p|`
s - p iff s P |p|´
s ,  A iff s - A
s -  A iff s , A
s , A^B iff Dtups “ t\ u & t , A & u , Bq
s - A^B iff s - A or s - B or
Dtups “ t\ u & t - A & u - Bq
s , A_B iff s , A or s , B or
Dtups “ t\ u & t , A & u , Bq
s - A_B iff Dtups “ t\ u & t - A & u - Bq
Given a set of formulas Γ, we define s , Γ (s - Γ) just in case s , B (s - B) for
each B P Γ. We extend the | ¨ |` and | ¨ |´ notation to all formulas A by setting
|A|` “ ts | s , Au and |A|´ “ ts | s - Au.
Given this semantics, no formula is valid (in the sense of being true at all states
in all models), and any set of formulas is satisfiable (just consider a state which
both truthmakes and falsemakes every sentence letter p). We characterise our
logic in terms of the entailments it supports. As usual, we treat entailment as the
preservation of truth from premises to conclusion. But in so doing, how should we
conceptualise our premises? As mentioned in §1, we could treat them collectively,
so that entailment amounts to preservation of truth from the conjoined premises
to the conclusion. Alternatively, we could treat our premises distributively, so
that entailment amounts to preservation of truth from each individual premise
to the conclusion. These notions coincide on single-premise entailments, but are
not equivalent when we have multiple premises.
When there are no further restrictions on the models we use, the conjunctive
approach will give us a nonmonotonic entailment relation. A will conjunctively-
entail A, but tA,Bu will not conjunctively-entail A (since A ^ B does not, in
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general, conjunctively-entail A.) Fine investigates this conjunctive notion of en-
tailment in combination with various restrictions on models [Fine, 2016]. Ac-
cordingly, we shall not say any more about it here.
We shall focus on the distributive notion of entailment, abbreviated as ‘(’,
which we define as follows:
Definition 2.4 (Exact Truthmaking Entailment). Γ ( A iff, for any model
M and any state s of M , M, s , A whenever M, s , Γ.
Exact equivalence is defined as two-way exact entailment. As the reader can
easily check, exact entailment satisfies the following equivalences and entail-
ments:
A^B )( B ^A A_B )( B _A
A^ pB ^ Cq )( pA^Bq ^ C A_ pB _ Cq )( pA_Bq _ C
A^ pB _ Cq )( pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq A_ pB ^ Cq ( pA_Bq ^ pA_ Cq
A^A )( A A_A )( A
 pA^Bq )(  A_ B  pA_Bq )(  A^ B
A,B ( A^B A ( A_B
  A )( A
Note that distribution of _ over ^ is not an equivalence, for pp_ qq ^ pp_ rq *
p_ pq ^ rq. To see this, take the model:
s3
s1
p
s2
r
In this model, s1 , p _ q and s2 , p _ r, hence s3 , pp _ qq ^ pp _ rq, but
s3 . p_ pq^ rq. Given the failure of _ to distribute over ^, our semantics does
not give rise to a ^,_-distributive lattice. This is precisely what makes reasoning
about the semantics more difficult (and more interesting) than would otherwise
be the case.
Note also that, since ^ is commutative and associative, it is harmless to writeŹtA1, . . . , Anu as A1 ^ ¨ ¨ ¨ ^An, and to ignore the ordering ďL .
We now turn to some results characterising the exact semantics, beginning
in the next section and culminating, in §4, with a characterisation theorem for
exact truthmaker entailment.
§3. Syntactic Selections and the Canonical Model. In this section, we
describe a way to extract from a sentence A a description of the definite ways a
truthmaker for A should be. These descriptions take the form of a set of literals.
Intuitively, a description tλ1, . . . , λnu describes a state s which is the fusion
of states s1, . . . , sn, where each si truthmakes literal λi. We will call such a
description, qua set of literals, a selection from A.
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As selections provide us with a syntactic means to reason about our semantics,
it is natural to begin our discussion by constructing a corresponding canonical
model.
Definition 3.1 (Canonical Model). LetM “ xSM, ĎM, | ¨ |`M, | ¨ |´My where:
‚ SM “ 2Λ, the set of all sets of literals;
‚ ĎM is Ď restricted to SM;
‚ |p|`M “ ttpuu;
‚ |p|´M “ tt puu.
M is clearly a genuine model.
Now we can define our notion of a selection from A.
Definition 3.2 (Selections). Given a formula A, a set of literals x is a selec-
tion from A just in case M, x , A (where M is the canonical model). The set of
all selections from A, SA, is tx |M, x , Au. We extend the terminology to sets
of sentences Γ: a selection from Γ contains one selection from each A P Γ. We
define the set of all selections from Γ, SΓ, as follows. When Γ “ tA1, A2, . . . u
for distinct A1, A2, . . . , SΓ is the collection of all sets tx1, x2, . . . u, for each xi a
selection from Ai.
We note an equivalent characterisation of SA:
Sp “ ttpuu and S p “ tt puu
SpA^Bq “ txY y | x P SA, y P SBu
S pA^Bq “ S AY S B Y Sp A^ Bq
SpA_Bq “ SAY SB Y SpA^Bq
S pA_Bq “ txY y | x P S A, y P S Bu
S  A “ SA
This presentation brings out the similarity between our notion of a selection and
van Fraassen’s definition [van Fraassen, 1969, 484] of truthmaking and falsemak-
ing sets.
The following lemmas show that selections are closed under union and, more
importantly, establish the relationship between A’s selections and the states that
truthmake A.
Lemma 3.3. For any model M and states s, u in M , if s , A and u , A then
s\ u , A.
Proof. By induction on A. Assume s , A and u , A. The base case holds
by definition 2.2. So assume the result holds for all B less complex than A and
consider these cases.
‚ A :“ B ^ C. Then s “ s1 \ s2, u “ u1 \ u2, where s1 , B, s2 , C,
u1 , B, and u2 , C. By hypothesis, s1 \ u1 , B and s2 \ u2 , C, so
s1 \ u1 \ s2 \ u2 , B ^ C, hence s\ u , B ^ C.
‚ A :“ B_C. Then (i) s , B, (ii) s , C, or (iii) s “ s1\s2 where s1 , B and
s2 , C; and (iv) u , B, (v) u , C, or (vi) u “ u1 \ u2 where u1 , B and
u2 , C. If (i) & (iv), then by hypothesis, s\u , B and so s\u , B_C. If
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(i) & (v), then by definition s\u , B_C. If (i) & (vi), then by hypothesis,
s\ u1 , B, and so ps1 \ u1q \ u2 , B _C, hence s\ u , B _C. The (ii)
& (iv), (ii) & (v), (ii) & (vi), (iii) & (iv), and (iii) & (v) cases are similar.
Finally, if (iii) and (vi), then by hypothesis, s1 \ u1 , B and s2 \ u2 , C,
so ps1 \ u1q \ ps2 \ u2q , B _ C and hence s\ u , B _ C.
‚ The A :“  pA^Bq and A :“  pA_Bq cases are similar, and the A :“   B
case is trivial.
%
Corollary 3.4. If x, y P SA then xY y P SA.
Proof. Suppose x, y P SA. Then by definition 3.2, M, x , A and M, y , A
(where M is the canonical model). By lemma 3.3, we have M, x\ y , A. Since
x\ y “ xY y in M, we have M, xY y , A and hence xY y P SA. %
Lemma 3.5 (Selection lemma). For any formula A, model M and state s in
M :
s , A iff, for some x P SA, s ,Źx.
Proof, left-to-right. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A.
Assume s , A. If A is a literal p or  p then SA is either ttpuu or tt puu. So for
any x P SA, Źx “ A and the result holds. Now assume that the result holds
for all B less complex than A, and consider these cases:
‚ If A :“ A1^A2 then s “ s1\s2 where s1 , A1 and s2 , A2. By hypothesis,
there are x P SA1 and y P SA2 such that s1 , Źx and s2 , Ź y. So
s , pŹxq ^ pŹ yq and hence s , Źpx Y yq. Since x Y y P SA (corollary
3.4), the result holds.
‚ If A :“ A1_A2 then either (i) s , A1, (ii) s , A2 or (iii) s “ s1\s2 where
s1 , A1 and s2 , A2. If (i) then, by hypothesis, there is some x P SA1
such that s , Źx. So by definition, x P SpA1 _ A2q. Case (ii) is similar.
If (iii) then by hypothesis there are x1 P SA1 and x2 P SA2 such that
s1 , Źx1 and s2 , Źx2. Then (reasoning as above) s , Źpx Y yq and
xY y P SpA1^A2q. But in general, SpB^Cq Ď SpB_Cq (definition 3.2),
and hence xY y P SA.
‚ The cases for A :“  pA _ Bq and A :“  pA ^ Bq are similar to the cases
above, respectively, and the case for A :“   A is trivial.
%
Right-to-left. Also by induction on the complexity of A. Assume there’s
some x P SA such that s ,Źx. As before, if A is a literal the result is immediate.
So assume that the result holds for all B less complex than A and consider these
cases:
‚ If A :“ A1 ^ A2 then by definition 3.2, for some x1 P SA1 and x2 P SA2,
x “ x1Y x2. Given that s ,Źpx1Y x2q, we have s , pŹx1q ^ pŹx2q and
so there are s1, s2 such that s “ s1 \ s2, s1 , Źx1 and s2 , Źx2. By
hypothesis, s1 , A1 and s2 , A2, and so s , A.
‚ If A :“ A1 _ A2 then, by definition 3.2, either (i) x P SA1, (ii) x P SA2 or
(iii) x P SpA1 ^ A2q. If (i) then, by hypothesis, s , A1 and hence s , A.
Similarly, if (ii) then s , A2 and hence s , A. And if (iii) then there are
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s1, s2 such that s “ s1 \ s2, s1 , Źx1 and s2 , Źx2. By hypothesis,
s1 , A1 and s2 , A2, and so s , A.
‚ Again, the cases for A :“  pA_Bq and A :“  pA^Bq are similar to the
cases above, respectively, and the case for A :“   A is trivial.
%
§4. Characterisation of Exact Entailment. In this section, we show how
to characterise exact entailment in terms of a syntactic relationship between
the premises and the conclusion. The conclusion must be built from selections
taken from the premises, in a certain way, in order for an exact entailment to
hold. We make this relationship precise in our characterisation theorem 4.12
below. Once we’ve established this theorem, compactness and decidability are
straightforward.
We proceed by showing how to transform a model in to a congruent model.
Intuitively, the congruent model takes certain states in the original model and
treats them as a single state. Our strategy is then to build a counter-model to a
purported entailment by identifying all the states which truthmake the premises,
and showing that this state does not truthmake the conclusion. The following
definitions and lemmas give the details.
Definition 4.1 (Overlap, difference, and convexity). A state ˝ is null just in
case ˝ Ď s for every s. If a null state exists, it is unique, and we reserve the name
‘˝’ for it. States s and u overlap iff some state t ‰ ˝ is a part of both: t Ď s and
t Ď u. The greatest lower bound of s and u, if there is one, is denoted s[u. The
difference of states s and u, written s´ u, is the unique state t (if there is one)
such that any v is a part of t iff v is a part of s but does not overlap u. (So, s´u
is the Ď-greatest part of s which does not overlap u, if there is one.) A set of
states S is closed under difference iff s´u P S whenever s, u P S. A set of states
S is convex iff t P S whenever s, u P S and s Ď t Ď u.
Note that s´˝ “ s and s´s “ ˝, for any state s. If S is closed under difference,
then s´ s P S for any s P S, and so ˝ P S.
For technical reasons, we will occasionally need to rely on models containing
the null state. But this is a harmless move for, as the following lemma shows,
we can always add the null state to the bottom of a model without changing the
model elsewhere.
Lemma 4.2 (Null state). Let M “ xS, Ď, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y and M˝ “ xS Y t˝u, Ď˝
, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y, where s Ď˝ u iff either s Ď u or s “ ˝. Then, for any s P S:
M, s , A iff M˝, s , A.
Proof. Given lemma 3.5, we need show only that M and M˝ agree on any
conjunction of literals at every s P S: M, s , l1^¨ ¨ ¨^ ln iff M˝, s , l1^¨ ¨ ¨^ ln.
In either model, s , l1^¨ ¨ ¨^ ln just in case there are states s1, . . . , sn such that
s “ s1 \ ¨ ¨ ¨ \ sn and, for each i ď n, si , li. Given that ˝ R V `p and ˝ R V ´p
for any sentence letter p, si , li implies si P S. And since M and M˝ agree on
all literals at every s P S, the result follows. %
Definition 4.3 (Congruence relation). Let M “ xS, Ď, |¨| ,` |¨|´y be a model
with S closed under arbitrary fusions (
Ů
U P S for any U Ď S) and pairwise
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difference. Let C Ď S be a convex set closed under \. We define ”C to be the
smallest equivalence relation on S such that:
(a) If s, u P C then s ”C u; and
(b) If s ”C s1 and u ”C u1 then s\ u ”C s1 \ u1.
(Note that there must exist a smallest such relation.) We will write rssC for
tu | u ”C su and boldface s, u, . . . for arbitrary equivalence classes.
The following lemma gives an equivalent characterisation of ”C .
Lemma 4.4. Let M and C be as above, and let s «C u whenever: either s “ u;
or else (i) there are c1, c2 P C such that c1 Ď s and c2 Ď u and (ii) s ´ŮC “
u´ŮC. Then s «C u iff s ”C u.
Proof, left-to-right. Assume s «C u. If s “ u then trivially, s ”C u; so
assume instead that s ‰ u. Then s ´ŮC “ u ´ŮC and hence s ´ŮC ”C
u ´ ŮC. Moreover, there are c1, c2 P C with c1 Ď s and c2 Ď u. Hence c1 Ď
ps[ŮCq Ď ŮC. Since C is \-closed and convex, we have ŮC P C and hence
ps [ ŮCq P C. Similarly, we have pu [ ŮCq P C and hence ps [ ŮCq ”C
pu[ŮCq. This gives us ps´ŮCq \ ps[ŮCq ”C pu´ŮCq \ pu[ŮCq and
hence s ”C u.
Right-to-left: We show «C satisfies clauses (a) and (b) of definition 4.3. If
s, u P C then condition (i) is satisfied with c1 “ s and c2 “ u and condition (ii)
is satisfied, since s´ŮC “ u´ŮC. Hence «C satisfies clause (a). Now assume
s «C s1 and u «C u1. If s “ s1 but u ‰ u1, then by definition there are c1, c2 P C
with c1 Ď u and c2 Ď u1, and u´ŮC “ u1´ŮC. Then c1 Ď s\u, c2 Ď s1\u1, and
ps\uq´ŮC “ ps´ŮCq\pu´ŮCq “ ps1´ŮCq\pu1´ŮCq “ ps1\u1q´ŮC,
and so s\u «C s1\u1. By similar reasoning, s\u «C s1\u1 if u “ u1 but s ‰ s1.
So now suppose s ‰ s1 and u ‰ u1. Then by definition there are c1, c2, c3, c4 P C
with c1 Ď s, c2 Ď u, c3 Ď s1 and c4 Ď u1. So c1 \ c2 Ď s\ u and c3 \ c4 Ď u\ u1
and, since C is \-closed, we have c1 \ c2, c3 \ c4 P C. Moreover, from condition
(ii), s´ŮC “ s1 ´ŮC and u´ŮC “ u1 ´ŮC, hence
ps´
ğ
Cq \ pu´
ğ
Cq “ ps1 ´
ğ
cq \ pu1 ´
ğ
cq
so
ps\ uq ´
ğ
c “ ps1 \ u1q ´
ğ
c
and hence s\ u «C s1 \ u1. Hence «C satisfies clause (b).
It remains only to show that «C is an equivalence relation. It is clearly reflexive
and symmetrical; so suppose s «C t and t «C u. If either s “ t or t “ u then
s «C u; so suppose this is not the case. Then by definition, we have c1, c2, c3 P C
with c1 Ď s, c2 Ď t, and c3 Ď u; and s ´ ŮC “ t ´ ŮC “ u ´ ŮC, hence
s «C u. It follows that «C is an equivalence relation and hence that s ”C u
implies s «C u. %
Definition 4.5. Let M and C be as above. We define an operator \C on
equivalence classes of states by setting s\C u “
ď
sPs,uPu
rs\ usC .
Lemma 4.6. rssC \C rusC “ rs\ usC .
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Proof. Suppose s, s1 P s and u, u1 P u. Then s ”C s1 and u ”C u1, hence by
definition, s\u ”C s1\u1 and so s1\u1 P rs\usC . It follows that, for any s P s
and u P u: ď
s1Ps,u1Pu
rs1 \ u1sC “ rs\ usC
and hence that rssC \C rusC “ rs\ usC . %
Definition 4.7 (Congruent structures). Let M and C be as above. We trans-
form M into a congruent structure, MC “ xSC, ĎC, | ¨ |`C, | ¨ |´Cy, where:
‚ SC “ trssC | s P Su
‚ s ĎC u iff s\C u “ u
‚ |p|`C “ trssC | s P |p|`u
‚ |p|´C “ trssC | s P |p|´u
Intuitively, a congruent structure treats all the elements of C as a single state,
and makes whatever identifications thereby follow.
Lemma 4.8. Let M and C be as above. Then MC is a model.
Proof. Given lemma 4.6, it follows that \C is commutative, associative and
idempotent and hence that ĎC is a partial order on SC . Moreover, lemma 4.6
guarantees that rssC \C rusC P SC whenever rssC , rusC P SC . It follows, by
definition 2.2, that MC is a model. %
Lemma 4.9. Let MC be as above. For any state u in MC , if there is no s P C
such that s Ď u Ď
Ů
C, then for no s P C is s ”C u.
Proof. By contraposition. Suppose there is some s P C such that s ”C u.
Then by lemma 4.4, s «C u. If s “ u then the result follows immediately; so
suppose s ‰ u. Then by definition of «C , (i) there is some c P C such that c Ď u
and (ii) s´ŮC “ u´ŮC. Since s P C, we have s Ď ŮC and hence u Ď ŮC,
which gives us c Ď u Ď
Ů
C. %
Lemma 4.10 (Congruent models). Let M and C be as in definition 4.7. We
form the congruent model MC . Then:
MC , s , A iff there is some u P s such that M,u , A.
Proof, left-to-right. By induction on A. Suppose MC , s , A. If A :“ p
then by definition, s P |p|`C “ trssC | s P |p|`u, hence for some u P s, u P |p|`,
and so M, s , p. Similarly, if A :“  p then s P |p|´C “ trssC | s P |p|´u, hence
for some u P s, u P |p|´, so M, s - p, and hence M, s ,  p. Now assume the
result holds for all B less complex than A.
‚ A :“ A1 ^ A2. Then s “ s1 \C s2 where MC , s1 , A1 and MC , s2 , A2.
So by hypothesis, there are u1 P s1 and u2 P s2 such that M,u1 , A1
and M,u2 , A2. Hence M,u1 \ u2 , A. Then we have s “ s1 \C s2 “
ru1sC \C ru2sC “ ru1 \ u2sC (by lemma 4.6), and hence u1 \ u2 P s.
‚ A :“ A1 _ A2. Then (i) MC , s , A1, (i) MC , s , A2, or (iii) s “ s1 \C s2
where MC , s1 , A1 and MC , s2 , A2. If (i) then, by hypothesis, M,u ,
A1, and hence M,u , A, for some u P s. Similarly, if (ii) then M,u , A2,
and hence M,u , A, for some u P s. If (iii) then, by the reasoning in the
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previous case, we have u1 \ u2 P s such that M,u1 , A1 and M,u2 , A2,
and hence M,u1 \ u2 , A.
‚ The cases for A :“  pA _ Bq and A :“  pA ^ Bq are similar to the cases
above, respectively, and the case for A :“   A is trivial.
%
Right-to-left. Again, by induction on A. Assume M,u , A for some u P s.
Then s “ rusC . If A :“ p then by definition, u P |p|`, so rusC P |p|`C , so
s P |p|`C , and hence MC , s , p. Similarly, if A :“  p then u P |p|´, so s P |p|´C ,
hence MC , s - p and so MC , s ,  p. Now assume the result holds for all B less
complex than A.
‚ A :“ A1 ^ A2. Then u “ u1 \ u2, where M,u1 , A1 and M,u2 , A2. By
hypothesis, MC , ru1sC , A1 and MC , ru2sC , A2, and hence MC , ru1sC\C
ru2sC , A. By lemma 4.6, ru1sC \C ru2sC “ ru1 \ u2sC “ rusC “ s, hence
MC , s , A.
‚ A :“ A1_A2. Then (i) M,u , A1, (ii) M,u , A2, or (iii) u “ u1\u2 where
M,u1 , A1 and M,u2 , A2. If (i) then, by hypothesis, MC , s , A1 and
hence MC , s , A. Similarly, if (ii) then MC , s , A2 and hence MC , s ,
A. If (iii) then, by reasoning in the previous case, MC , ru1sC , A1 and
MC , ru2sC , A2, hence MC , ru1sC \C ru2sC , A, and ru1sC \C ru2sC “ s.
So MC , s , A.
‚ Again, the cases for A :“  pA_Bq and A :“  pA^Bq are similar to the
cases above, respectively, and the case for A :“   A is trivial.
%
We now form a congruence relation on our canonical model, transforming the
latter into a congruent canonical model. Note that, since states in the canonical
model are sets of sentences, the set of all such states is trivially closed under
arbitrary fusions and difference; and we can always take a set of canonical model
states S and close it under convexity and pairwise fusion. We use the resulting
set of states, C, to form our convex canonical model.
Corollary 4.11. Let M “ xS, Ď, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y be the canonical model, and
C Ď S be convex and closed under Y. Form the congruent canonical model MC .
Then MC , s , A iff sX SA ‰ H.
Proof. From lemma 4.10 and lemma 3.5, we have MC , s , A iff M, u , A
for some u P s iff M, u ,Źx for some u P s and x P SA. But by construction of
M, this holds iff x “ u for some u P s and x P SA and hence iff sXSA ‰ H. %
Now for our characterisation theorem, which says the following. Suppose we
have an entailment from premises Γ to conclusion A. Then, for any selection
X from the premises, we must be able to find a selection y from the conclusion
which lies between some specific x P X and X itself: x Ď y Ď ŤX. Intuitively, we
may think of selections as describing specific truth-grounds for a sentence. So our
theorem intuitively says: an entailment holds when, for any collection of truth-
grounds for the premises, some truth-ground for the conclusion lies in-between
one and all of those premise truth-grounds.
Let us illustrate the idea. Consider the entailment: p, r ( pp _ qq ^ r. The
selections for p and r are just tpu and tru (neither of which is a selection from
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pp_ qq ^ r). But ttpu, truu is the only selection from the premise-set tp, ru and
tp, ru is a selection from the conclusion. This gives us the inclusion relationship
tpu Ď tp, ru Ď Ťttpu, truu, which satisfies the theorem’s condition on entailment,
hence p, r ( pp_ qq ^ r.
Theorem 4.12 (Characterisation of (). Γ ( A if and only if, for any X P
SΓ, some y P SA and some x P X: x Ď y Ď ŤX.
Proof, left-to-right. We show the contrapositive. Assume that, for some
X P SΓ (which we keep fixed) and any y P SA, there is no x P X such that
x Ď y Ď ŤX. Now let C be the closure of X under \, ´, and convexity. ThenŤ
C “ ŤX and, for any z P C, there is some x P X with x Ď z and so, for any
y P SA, there is no x P C such that x Ď y Ď ŤC. Now let MC be the congruent
canonical model over C. Then C is a state of MC , C “ rxsC for any x P C, and
there is no x P C and y P SA such that x Ď y Ď ŮC. So, by lemma 4.9, for no
x P C and y P SA do we have x ”C y. It follows that SA X C “ H and so, by
corollary 4.11, MC , C . A. Moreover, for each B P Γ, we have SB X X ‰ H,
hence SB X C ‰ H and so, by corollary 4.11, MC , C , B. It follows that
Γ * A. %
Right-to-left. Assume the right-hand-side of the theorem and take any
model M and state s in M and suppose that s , Γ. We show s , A. For each
B P Γ, we have s , B and so, by lemma 3.5, s , Źx for some x P SB. So for
some X P SΓ, we have s , Źx for each x P X: we now hold this X fixed. By
assumption, for some y P SA and some x P X, we have x Ď y Ď ŤX. Moreover,
y ´ x Ď z for some z P X and hence s ,Ź z. So for any l P y ´ x, there is some
t Ď s such that t , l. It follows that there is some u Ď s such that u ,Źpy´xq,
hence s \ u , Źx ^Źpy ´ xq and so s , Ź y. Since y P SA, lemma 3.5 gives
us s , A. It follows that Γ ( A. %
§5. Compactness and Decidability. We turn to compactness. Note that
we cannot meaningfully express compactness in terms of satisfiability (i.e., by
saying that any set of formulas is satisfiable iff all its finite subsets are) since,
as we have already noted, any set of formulas is satisfiable in the truthmaking
semantics. So we present our compactness result (theorem 5.2 below) in terms
of entailment.
Lemma 5.1. Let J be a constant verified and falsified by every state in every
model. For any formula A and set of sentence letters P , let ArJ{P s be the formula
obtained from A by uniformly substituting J for each p P P in A. Then A (
ArJ{P s.
Proof. By induction on A. The base case holds trivially, so suppose the result
holds for all B less complex than A, suppose s , A, and consider these cases.
‚ A :“ A1^A2. Then s “ s1\s2 where s1 , A1 and s2 , A2. By hypothesis,
s1 , A1rJ{P s and s2 , A2rJ{P s, hence s , A1rJ{P s ^ A2rJ{P s and so
s , ArJ{P s.
‚ A :“ A1_A2. Then s , A1, s , A2, or else s “ s1\ s2 where s1 , A1 and
s2 , A2. If s , A1 then by hypothesis s , A2rJ{P s, hence s , A1rJ{P s _
A2rJ{P s and so s , pA1 _ A2qrJ{P s. Similarly if s , A2. Otherwise, by
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hypothesis s1 , A1rJ{P s and s2 , A2rJ{P s, hence s , A1rJ{P s _ A2rJ{P s
and so s , ArJ{P s.
‚ Again, the cases for A :“  pA_Bq and A :“  pA^Bq are similar to the
cases above, respectively, and the case for A :“   A is trivial.
%
Theorem 5.2 (Compactness). If Γ ( A then ∆ ( A for some finite ∆ Ď Γ.
Proof. Fix the conclusion A, and for any formula B, let BA be the result of
substituting J in B for any sentence letter not in A. Let ΓA “ tBA | B P Γu.
Since ( is closed under uniform substitution, ΓA ( A. We then partition ΓA into
equivalence classes and pick one sentence from each class: let the resulting set be
∆A. Then ∆A ( A too. And since ΓA is constructed from a finite set of sentence
letters, there are finitely many such equivalence classes and so ∆A is finite. Now,
for each BA P ∆A, we pick a corresponding B1 P Γ, such that B1A “ BA. (Note
that BA need not uniquely determine this B1.) Let ∆ be the set of the chosen
B1s. Then ∆ Ď Γ is finite. Now suppose s , ∆. Then, by lemma 5.1, s , ∆A,
hence s , ΓA and so s , A. It follows that ∆ ( A. %
Theorem 5.3 (Decidability). For finite Γ, it is decidable whether Γ ( A.
Proof. By theorem 4.12, there is a correct algorithm for checking whether
Γ ( A which cycles through each X P SΓ, checking whether there is some
x P X and some y P SA such that x Ď y Ď ŤX. Each such x, y and ŤX
is a finite set, so each such check is a finite procedure. Since there are at most
|SΓ| ¨ maxt|X| | X P SΓu ¨ |SA| such checks to perform, the procedure will
terminate after finitely many steps. %
§6. Non-Vacuous and Convex Models. In this section, we consider two
conditions in turn, non-vacuity and convexity, and investigate whether they affect
the exact entailment relation.
Non-Vacuous Models. In non-vacuous models, every sentence letter p has
a truthmaker and a falsemaker:
Definition 6.1 (Non-vacuous models). A model M “ xS, Ď, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y is
non-vacuous iff, for each sentence letter p in the language, both |p|` and |p|´
are nonempty.
In a non-vacuous model M , the sets |A|` and |A|´ are non-empty for arbitrary
formulas A (as the reader can easily check).
Definition 6.2 (Non-vacuous exact entailment).
We show that non-vacuous exact entailment is exact entailment:
Theorem 6.3. Γ (nv A if and only if Γ ( A.
Proof, left-to-right. By contraposition. Suppose Γ * A. Then there is a
model M and state s in M such that M, s , Γ but M, s . A. We transform M
into M˚ by adding a single state, t, such that u Ă t for each state u in M , and
adding t to both |p|` and |p|´ for every sentence letter p. Then t\u “ t for each
state u in M˚, hence each pair of states in M˚ has a least upper bound. This
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guarantees that M˚ is a genuine model. Moreover, M˚ is non-vacuous, since
t P |p|` X |p|´ for each p. Now we show, by induction on A, that M˚, u , A iff
M,u , A for each u in M .
In the only if direction, the base case holds, given that t is not in M . So
suppose the result holds for all B less complex than A, and consider these cases.
‚ A :“ A1 ^A2. Then u “ u1 \ u2 where M˚, u1 , A1 and M˚, u2 , A2. So
by hypothesis, M,u1 , A1 and M,u2 , A2, hence M,u , A.
‚ A :“ A1 _ A2. Then M˚, s , A1, M˚, s , A2, or u “ u1 \ u2 where
M˚, u1 , A1 and M˚, u2 , A2. So by hypothesis, M,u , A1, M,u , A2,
or else M,u1 , A1 and M,u2 , A2. Either way, we have M,u , A.
‚ The A :“  pA1 _ A2q and A :“  pA1 ^ A2q cases are similar, and the
A :“   A1 case is trivial.
The if direction is similar. So, given that M, s , Γ but M, s . A, we have
M˚, s , Γ and M˚, s . A, and hence Γ *nv A.
Right-to-left: Trivial, given that all non-vacuous models are models. %
It is worth noting that the proof of theorem 4.12 gives us an alternative proof
of theorem 6.3, given that the congruent canonical model used in that proof is
non-vacuous.
Convex Models. Our current understanding of truthmaking allows struc-
tures like the following, where the shaded area marks truthmakers for pp^qq_r:
s7
s4
s1
p
s5 s6
s3
r
s2
q
Here, s7 has parts (s5 and s6) which do not truthmake pp^ qq_ r, each of which
has a further part (s3) which does truthmake pp^qq_r. So, we can begin with a
truthmaker for pp^qq_r, add to it so that it will no longer truthmake pp^qq_r,
and add to it further, so that it will again truthmake pp^ qq_ r. In other words,
the set of states |pp^ qq _ r|` is not convex.
We can work instead with the convex closure of the truthmaking and falsemak-
ing sets (definition 4.1), which we denote |A|`˚ and |A|´˚. These obey a selection
lemma:
Lemma 6.4 (Convex selection lemma). For any formula A, model M and state
s in M : s P |A|`˚ iff there are x, y P SA & states t Ď s Ď u such that t ,Źx &
u ,Ź y.
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Proof, left-to-right. Assume s P |A|`˚. Then by definition there are t, u P
|A|` with t Ď s Ď u. Since t , A and u , A, by lemma 3.5 there are x, y P SA
such that t ,Źx and u ,Ź y. %
Right-to-left. Assume there are x, y P SA and states t Ď s Ď u such that
t , Źx and u , Ź y. By lemma 3.5, t , A and u , A and so, by definition,
s P |A|`˚. %
We use these notions to define convex exact entailment, and show that it
coincides with exact entailment:
Definition 6.5 (Convex exact entailment). Γ convex exactly entails A, Γ (˚
A, iff for any model M : |A|`˚ Ď |Γ|`˚ in M .
Theorem 6.6 (Convex exact entailment). Γ (˚ A iff Γ ( A.
Proof, left-to-right. Suppose Γ * A. Then there is a model M “ xS, Ď
, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y and state s in M such that M, s , Γ but M, s . A. Let Ms be the
model just like M except restricted to states u Ď s. Then, for all u Ď s in M ,
Ms, u , A iff M,u , A. Hence Ms, s , Γ but Ms, s . A, so s R |A|` and so
(since s is the top state in Ms) s R |A|`˚. Since |Γ|` Ď |Γ|`˚, Γ *˚ A. %
Right-to-left. Suppose Γ ( A and s P |Γ|`˚. Then, for each B P Γ, there are
states sB1 Ď s Ď sB2 such that sB1 , B and sB2 , B. By lemma 3.5, for each B P Γ,
there are selections xB1 , x
B
2 P SB such that sB1 ,
Ź
xB1 and s
B
2 ,
Ź
xB2 . Let
X1 “ txB1 | B P Γu and X2 “ txB2 | B P Γu. Then X1, X2 P SΓ. So by theorem
4.12, there are y1, y2 P SA, z1 P X1, and z2 P X2 such that z1 Ď y1 Ď ŤX1
and z2 Ď y2 Ď ŤX2. For some B1, B2 P Γ, z1 “ xB11 and z2 “ xB22 and hence
sB
1
1 ,
Ź
z1 and s
B2
2 ,
Ź
z2.
Now take any literal l P ŤX1. Then l P xBi for some B P Γ and xi P SB.
So there is a state sB Ď s such that sB , ŹxBi and, since xBi is finite, there
is a state s1 Ď sB Ď s such that s1 , l. Now consider y1 ´ z1. This is a finite
set of literals tl1, . . . , lnu Ď X1 for which, by the preceding reasoning, there
are states ti Ď s such that ti , li for each i ď n, and hence there is a state
t “ pt1 \ ¨ ¨ ¨ \ tnq Ď s such that t , Źpy1 ´ z1q. Similarly, there is some u Ď s
such that u , Źpy2 ´ z2q. Then sB11 \ t , Ź y1 and sB22 \ u , Ź y2. But
sB
1
1 Ď s Ď sB
2
2 and so psB11 \ tq Ď s Ď psB22 \ uq. By lemma 3.5, sB11 \ t , A and
sB
2
2 \ u , A, and so s P |A|`˚. Hence Γ (˚ A. %
An Alternative Approach to Convexity. In defining (˚, we have not
changed our truthmaking or falsemaking clauses. There is an alternative ap-
proach, in which we replace these with truthmaking and falsemaking relations
,cvx and -cvx , defined recursively:
Definition 6.7.
s ,cvx A_B iff either s ,cvx A; or s ,cvx B; or there are t, u such that:
t ,cvx A, u ,cvx B and either t Ď s Ď t\ u or u Ď s Ď t\ u
s -cvx A^B iff either s -cvx A; or s -cvx B; or there are t, u such that:
t -cvx A, u -cvx B and either t Ď s Ď t\ u or u Ď s Ď t\ u
The remaining ,cvx and -cvx clauses are identical to the , and - clauses given
in definition 2.3, §2.
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In general, these are not convex relations. In the model below, s1 ,cvx p^ q,
s5 ,cvx p^ q, s1 Ď s3 Ď s5, and yet s3 .cvx p^ q:
s5
s2p s3 s4 q
s1
p q
This model is non-distributive, for s3 [ ps2 \ s4q “ s3 ‰ s1 “ ps3 [ s2q \ ps3 [
s4q. And in general, we can show that any counter-model to convexity is non-
distributive. Restricting to distributive models, the truthmaking and falsemaking
sets defined over ,cvx and -cvx are convex, and provide us with an alternative
definition of convex exact entailment.
Definition 6.8 (Distributive models). A model M “ xS,Ď, | ¨ | ,` | ¨ |´y is
distributive iff, for all s, t, u P S: s[ pt\ uq “ ps[ tq \ ps[ uq.
Definition 6.9. Γ (cvx A iff for every distributive model M in which |p|`
and |p|´ are convex for every sentence letter p, and for every state s in M :
M, s ,cvx A only if M, s ,cvx Γ.
Lemma 6.10 (Convexity). In a distributive model M for which |p|` and |p|´
are convex for every sentence letter p, ts | s ,cvx Au “ |A|`˚ and ts | s -cvx
Au “ |A|´˚ for every A.
Proof. The proof, which we omit here, shows that ts | s ,cvx Au Ď |A|`˚
and that |A|`˚ Ď ts | s ,cvx Au by induction on A. We note that the only case to
make use of distribution is the conjunction case for |A|`˚ Ď ts | s ,cvx Au. %
Corollary 6.11. In a distributive model in which |p|` and |p|´ are convex
for every sentence letter p, if s ,cvx A, u ,cvx A, and s Ď t Ď u, then t ,cvx A.
Proof. Immediate from lemma 6.10. %
Theorem 6.12. Γ (cvx A iff Γ (˚ A iff Γ ( A.
Proof. Immediate from lemma 6.10 and theorem 6.6. %
§7. Non-Vacuous Convex Models. We have seen that both non-vacuous
exact entailment and convex exact entailment coincide with exact entailment.
But when we combine both conditions, non-vacuity and convexity, we obtain a
different consequence relation, which we investigate in this section.
Definition 7.1 (Non-vacuous convex exact entailment). Γ non-vacuously con-
vex entails A, Γ (nv˚ A, just in case, for every non-vacuous model M : |A|`˚ Ď
|Γ|`˚ in M .
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We showed above that ( coincides with both (nv and (˚. However, it does
not coincide with (nv˚. Non-vacuous convex entailment supports inferencesľ
x (nv˚
ľ
x1 _
ľ
x2
for any sets of literals x, x1, x2 such that x1 Ď x Ď x2 (whereas exact entailment
need not support such inferences). For example, we have
p_ pp^ qq _ pp^ q ^ rq (nv˚ p_ pp^ q ^ rq
and yet, as the reader can easily check,
p_ pp^ qq _ pp^ q ^ rq * p_ pp^ q ^ rq
We now prepare for a syntactic characterisation of non-vacuous convex entail-
ment, along the lines of theorem 4.12.
Lemma 7.2 (Congruent canonical model convexity). For any set of sets of lit-
erals C Ď 2Λ, let MC be the congruent canonical model over C. Then, for any
sets of literals x, y and states s ‰ C, t, and u in MC : if s Ď t Ď u, s , Źx,
and u ,Ź z, then there is some y such that x Ď y Ď z and t ,Ź y.
Proof. Assume s Ď t Ď u, s ,Źx, and u ,Ź z in MC . Then by construc-
tion of MC , s “ rxsC and u “ rzsC and, for some y, t “ rysC . By definition,
rzsC “ rysC \C rzsC “ ry Y zsC , so z ”C y Y z, so by lemma 4.4, z «C y Y z.
Then by definition, either (i) z “ yY z (so y Ď z) or else (ii) there are c1, c2 P C
such that c1 Ď z, c2 Ď py Y zq, and z ´ŤC “ py Y zq ´ŤC. So, if y Ę z, then
y P C and z XŤC ‰ H. Either way, there is some y1 P rysC such that y1 Ď z.
Since ry1sC “ rysC , we have rxsC Ď ry1sC . By the same reasoning, if x Ę y, then
x P C and y X ŤC ‰ H. But by assumption, rxsC ‰ C, hence x R C, hence
x Ď y1 Ď z. Finally, by lemma 4.10, rysC ,Ź y1 and hence t ,Ź y1. %
Our previous characterisation theorem (4.12) for ( fails for (nv˚, for it re-
quires (in the case of single-premise inferences, A ( B) that every selection from
A to be a selection from B too. But non-vacuous convex exact entailment relaxes
this requirement: each selection from the premise must be in-between (wrt Ď) se-
lections from the conclusion. This suggests that we should characterise Γ (nv˚ A
in terms of the convex closure of SA, S˚A, in place of SA. Theorem 7.4 below
generalises this idea to the multiple-premise case. (Note that 4.12 is a special
case of 7.4, for which y P SA.)
Definition 7.3. For any A, S˚A is the convex closure (wrt Ď) of SA: the
smallest set of sets of literals such that y P S˚A whenever there are x, z P S˚A
such that x Ď y Ď z.
Theorem 7.4 (Characterisation of (nv˚). Γ (nv˚ A if and only if, for any
X P SΓ, some x P X and some y P S˚A: x Ď y Ď ŤX.
Proof, left-to-right. Assume that, for some X P S˚Γ (which we keep
fixed) and any y P S˚A, there is no x P X such that x Ď y Ď ŤX. Let C be the
\, ´, and convex closure of X, and MC be the congruent canonical model over
C. Following the proof of theorem 4.12, for any y P S˚A, there is no s P C such
that y ”C s, hence MC , C . Ź y. Now suppose, for reductio, that C P |A|`˚.
Then, by lemma 6.4, there are selections y1, y2 P SA and states s Ď C Ď u inMC
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such that s P |Ź y1|`˚ and u P |Ź y2|`˚. Then MC , s ,Ź y1 and MC ,u ,Ź y2.
Given the reasoning above, s ‰ C ‰ u and so, by lemma 7.2, there is a y such
that y1 Ď y Ď y2 and MC , C , Ź y. But, since y1, y1 P SA, it follows that
y P S˚A: contradiction. So C R |A|`˚. Moreover (by the proof of theorem 4.12),
C P |Γ|`, hence C P |Γ|`˚. Since MC is non-vacuous, we have Γ *nv˚ A. %
Right-to-left. Assume the right-hand-side of the theorem and take any
non-vacuous model M and state s such that s P |Γ|`˚. By lemma 6.4, for each
B P Γ, there are x, y P SA and states t Ď s and u Ě s such that t , Źx and
u ,Ź y. Then there are X1, X2 P SΓ (which we hold fixed) such that, for each
x1 P X1, there is a t Ď s such that t , Źx1 and, for each x2 P X2, there is a
u Ě s such that s ,Źx2. By assumption, there are x1 P X1 and y1 P SA with
x1 Ď y1 Ď ŤX1. So, for some t Ď s, t ,Źx1. Now let y ´ x “ tl1, . . . , lnu. For
each such li, there is a ti Ď s such that ti , li, hence t \ t1 \ ¨ ¨ ¨ \ tn , Ź y
and t \ t1 \ ¨ ¨ ¨ \ tn Ď s. Similarly, there are x2 P X2 and y2 P SA with
x2 Ď y2 Ď ŤX2. So, for some u Ě s, u , Źx2. Since M is non-vacuous, there
is a v in M such that v , Źpy2 ´ x2q, hence x2 \ v , Ź y2, and s Ď px2 \ vq.
Then lemma 6.4 implies s P |A|`˚, and hence Γ (nv˚ A. %
§8. Proof Theory. In this section, we set out a proof system corresponding
to exact entailment. (We leave a system corresponding to non-vacuous convex
exact entailment for future work.) Our proof system defines a derivability relation
$, holding between a set of sets of formulas and a set of formulas. To avoid
an over-abundance of ‘t’s and ‘u’s, we use an alternative notation for writing
sequents, as follows:
A1, . . . , An;B1, . . . , Bm;C1, . . . , Ck $ D1, . . . , Di
Here, we have two premise-grouping pieces of punctuation, ‘;’ and ‘,’. A list
‘A1, . . . , An’ not broken by a semicolon notates a set of formulas, whereas the
concatenation of sets of formulas is notated by the semicolon. So, for example,
‘A;B;C’ notates the set ttAu, tBu, tCuu, whereas ‘A,B,C’ notates ttA,B,Cuu.
Observe that, in this notation, ‘C;B;A’ and ‘C;C;B;A’ also notate the former
set, and ‘C,B,A’ and ‘C,C,B,A’ also notate the latter. (Which set a list notates
is not affected by re-ordering or repetition.)
The intuitive interpretation of this notation is that comma-separated formulas
are taken conjunctively, whereas semicolon-separated formulas are taken individ-
ually. So, the above sequent
A1, . . . , An;B1, . . . , Bm;C1, . . . , Ck $ D1, . . . , Di
is intended to capture the inference from premises A1^¨ ¨ ¨^An, B1^¨ ¨ ¨^Bm,
and C1^¨ ¨ ¨^Ck, to conclusion D1^¨ ¨ ¨^Di. Note that this is not the usual multi-
conclusion sequent, since ‘D1, . . . , Di’ on the right captures the Ds conjunctively,
not individually.
To preserve the appearance of traditional sequent rules, we will henceforth use
upper-case ‘Γ’, ‘∆’ as variables for sets of sets of formulas, and use lower-case
‘γ’, ‘δ’, ‘ξ’ as variables for sets of formulas. We then write the general form of a
sequent as ‘Γ $ γ’. We indicate that A and B (together with the formulas in γ)
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are to be taken conjunctively on the left (or the right) by writing ‘Γ; γ,A,B $ δ’
(or ‘Γ $ γ,A,B’).
Structural Rules.
γ $ γ (id)
Γ $ δ
Γ; γ $ δ (weak)
Γ $ γ Γ; γ $ δ
Γ $ δ (cut)
Γ; γ $ ξ Γ; δ $ χ
Γ; γ, δ $ ξ, χ (,1)
Γ $ γ Γ $ δ, ξ
Γ $ γ, δ (,2)
Since this notation for sets is invariant under reordering and repetition, the
system automatically has the following left and right exchange and contraction
rules, both for the comma (left and right) and the semicolon (on the left only)
built in:
Γ; γ,A,B, δ $ ξ
Γ; γ,B,A, δ $ ξ (ex,l)
Γ $ γ,A,B, δ
Γ $ γ,B,A, δ (ex,r)
Γ; ∆1; ∆2; Ξ $ γ
Γ; ∆2; ∆1; Ξ $ γ
(ex;l)
Γ; γ,A,A, δ $ ξ
Γ; γ,A, δ $ ξ (w,l)
Γ $ γ,A,A, δ
Γ $ γ,A, δ (w,r)
Γ; ∆; ∆; Ξ $ γ
Γ; ∆; Ξ $ γ (w;l)
Some comments on (,1) and (,2) are in order. (,1) allows premises to be com-
bined with ‘,’ so long as the conclusions are simultaneously combined with ‘,’.
Intuitively, (,1) says that, if we can prove B1 from A1 and B2 from A2, then
we can prove B1 ^ B2 from A1 ^ A2. (,2) allows us to combine a conclusion, γ,
with any nonempty subset δ of a conclusion δ, ξ. The intuition here is that, if
Γ exactly proves γ, and Γ is sufficient for δ (in the sense that Γ exactly proves
some superset δ, ξ), then Γ exactly proves γ, δ.
These two rules (,1) and (,2) perform genuinely distinct duties. If we attempt
to combine them into a single rule,
Γ; γ $ ξ Γ; δ $ χ, σ
Γ; γ, δ $ ξ, χ (ˆ)
we will be able to prove too much, as the following derivation shows:
A $ A A,B $ A,B
(ˆ)
A,B $ A,A
(w,r)
A,B $ A
(^l)
A^B $ A
But A^B * A, so (ˆ) is unsound.
Logical Rules.
Γ; γ,A,B $ δ
Γ; γ,A^B $ δ (^l)
Γ $ γ,A,B
Γ $ γ,A^B (^r)
Γ; γ, A, B $ δ
Γ; γ, pA_Bq $ δ ( _l)
Γ $ γ, A, B
Γ $ γ, pA_Bq ( _r)
Γ; γ,A $ ξ Γ; γ,B $ ξ
Γ; γ,A_B $ ξ (_l)
Γ $ γ,A{B
Γ $ γ,A_B (_r)
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Γ; γ, A $ ξ Γ; γ, B $ ξ
Γ; γ, pA^Bq $ ξ ( ^l)
Γ $ γ, A{ B
Γ $ γ, pA^Bq ( ^r)
Γ; γ,A $ δ
Γ; γ,  A $ δ (  l)
Γ $ γ,A
Γ $ γ,  A (  r)
A derivation of Γ $ γ is a tree of rule instances, with an instance of (id) at
each leaf and Γ $ γ at the root.
Examples. To illustrate the system, we offer some sample derivations. To
derive conjunction introduction:
A $ A B $ B
(,1)
A,B $ A,B
(^r)
A,B $ A^B
To derive distribution of ^ over _:
A $ A B $ B
(,1)
A,B $ A,B
(^r)
A,B $ A^B
(_r)
A,B $ pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq
A $ A C $ C
(,1)
A,C $ A,C
(^r)
A,C $ A^ C
(_r)
A,C $ pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq
(_l)
A,B _ C $ pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq
(^l)
A^ pB _ Cq $ pA^Bq _ pA^ Cq
To derive a disjunction from the corresponding conjunction:
A $ A
(_r)
A $ A_B
B $ B
(_r)
B $ A_B
(,1)
A,B $ A_B,A_B
(wr)
A,B $ A_B
(^l)
A^B $ A_B
§9. Soundness and Completeness. The proof system just presented is
sound and complete with respect to exact truthmaking entailment. Let’s intro-
duce a bit more terminology to help us through these proofs.
Definition 9.1 (Fit and support). For any set of literals y and any set of
sets of literals X, we will say that y fits X iff there is some x P X such that
x Ď y Ď ŤX. For any set of formulas Γ and formula A, we say that Γ supports
A iff, for any X P SΓ, some y P SA fits X.
The idea here is that y’s fitting X corresponds to X $ y (as we show in lemma
9.3 below). We found we were unable to establish soundness in the usual way, via
a semantic argument. The proof below goes via characterisation theorem 4.12
from §4.
Theorem 9.2 (Soundness). For any Γ Ď 2L, let Γ^ “ tŹ γ | γ P Γu. Then
Γ $ γ only if Γ^ (Ź γ.
Proof. Given the characterisation theorem 4.12, it is sufficient to show that
Γ^ supports
Ź
γ whenever Γ $ γ. Since this holds trivially for (id) (tAu supports
A), it is sufficient to show that each rule preserves the support relation from
upper to lower sequents. We show the cases for our structural rules (,1) and (,2),
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and for a sample logical rule, (_l). The other structural rules are straightforward,
and the cases for the other logical rules are similar to the (_l) case.
(,1) Suppose pΓYtγuq^ supportsŹ ξ and pΓYtδuq^ supportsŹχ. Now consider
any X P SppΓ Y tγ Y δuq^q “ SpΓ^ Y tŹpγ Y δuqq. Then X “ X1 Y txu
where X1 P SΓ^ and x P SŹpγ Y δq, hence x “ x1 Y x2, where x1 P SŹ γ
and x2 P SŹ δ. Then X1 Y tx1u P SppΓ Y tγuq^q and so, by assumption,
some y P SŹ ξ fits X1Ytx1u. Similarly, X1Ytx2u P Spp∆Ytδuq^q and so,
by assumption, some z P SŹχ fits X2Ytx2u. Then there are u P X1Ytx1u
and v P X1 Y tx2u such that u Ď y and v Ď z. If u P X1 or v P X1, then
either u P X or v P X. If not, then u “ x1, v “ x2, so u Y v P X. Either
way, we have some w P X with w Ď yY y. Moreover, y Ď ŤX1 Y tx1u and
z Ď ŤX1 Y tx2u, and so y Y z Ď ŤpX1 Y tx1u Y tx2uq “ ŤX. So y Y z
fits X. Since y Y z P SŹpξ Y χq, it follows that pΓ Y tγ Y δuq^ supportsŹpξ Y χq.
(,2) Suppose Γ^ supports both
Ź
γ and
ŹpδY ξq. Now consider any X P SΓ^.
By assumption, some y P SŹ γ and some z P SŹpδ Y ξq each fit X. Then
z “ z1 Y z2 where z1 P SŹ δ and z2 PŹ ξ, hence y Y z1 P SŹpγ Y δq. So
there is an x P X such that x Ď y, hence x Ď y Y z1. Moreover, y Ď ŤX
and z1 Ď z Ď ŤX, hence y Y z1 Ď ŤX. It follows that y Y z1 fits X, and
hence that Γ^ supports
Źpγ Y δq.
(_l) Suppose pΓ Y tγ Y tAuuq^ “ Γ^ Y tŹ γ ^ Au and pΓ Y tγ Y tBuuq^ “
Γ^ Y tŹ γ ^Bu each support Ź ξ, and consider any
X P SppΓY tγ Y tA_Buuq^q “ SpΓ^ Y t
ľ
γ ^ pA_Bquq.
Then X “ X1Ytx2Yx3u where X1 P SΓ^, x2 P SŹ γ, and x3 P SpA_Bq.
Then (i) x3 P SA, (ii) x3 P SB, or (iii) x3 “ z1 Y z2 where z1 P SA and
z2 P SB. If (i) then by assumption, some y P SŹ ξ fits X1Ytx2Y x3u and
hence y fits X. Similarly if (ii). If (iii), then some y P SŹ ξ fits X1Ytx2Yz1u
and, since X1 Ď X and x2Y z1 Ď x2Yx3 P X, y also fits X. It follows that
pΓY tγ Y tA_Buuq^ supports Ź ξ.
%
Now we build up to a completeness proof, by establishing the following lemmas.
Lemma 9.3. If y fits X, then X $ y.
Proof. Suppose y fits X. Then by definition, there is some x P X such that
x Ď y Ď ŤX and so, via (id) and (weak), X $ x. Now let y´ x “ tl1, . . . , lnu.
For each li, i ď n, there is some z P X such that li P z, hence X $ z. So by n
applications of (,2), we get X $ x, l1, . . . , ln, which is X $ y. %
Lemma 9.4. If y P SA and y fits X, then X $ A.
Proof. By induction on A. For the base case, we have y “ tAu and so, by
lemma 9.3, X $ y and hence X $ tAu, which we conventionally write as X $ A.
Now assume the result holds for all B less complex than A, and consider these
cases.
‚ A :“ A1 ^ A2. Then y “ y1 Y y2 where y1 P SA1 and y2 P SA2 and,
for some x P X, we have x Ď py1 Y y2q Ď ŤX. Now let Y “ X ´ x,
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x1 “ x X y1 and x2 “ x X y2. Then y1 fits Y Y tx1u and y2 fits Y Y tx2u.
So by hypothesis, Y ;x1 $ A1 and Y ;x2 $ A2. Applying (,1) and (^r), we
derive Y ;x1, x2 $ A1, A2 and then Y ;x1, x2 $ A1 ^ A2. Here, ‘Y ;x1, x2’
notates the set
Y Y tx1 Y x2u “ Y Y tpxX y1q Y pxX y2qu “ Y Y txu “ X
since x Ď py1 Y y2q, and hence X $ A.
‚ A :“ A1 _ A2. Then either y P SA1, y P SA2, or else y “ y1 Y y2 where
y1 P SA1 and y2 P SA2. If y P SA1 then, by hypothesis, X $ A1, and
by (_r), we infer X $ A. Similarly, if y P SA2 then X $ A2 and hence
X $ A. Otherwise, reasoning as in the ^ case, we infer X $ A1, A2. Then
using (_r), we infer X $ A1 _A2, A1 _A2, which (given that contraction
is built into our notation) amounts to X $ A.
‚ The A :“  pA1 _ A2q and A :“  pA1 ^ A2q cases are similar to the cases
above (respectively), and the A :“   A1 case is trivial.
%
Lemma 9.5. For any Γ Ď 2L, γ Ď L, A and B: if Γ; γ, β $ A for each β P SB,
then Γ; γ,B $ A.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of B. Assume Γ; γ, β $ A for each
β P SB. For the base case B :“ p or B :“  p, we have SB “ ttpuu or SB “
tt puu, so the result is immediate. For our inductive hypothesis, assume that
for all C less complex than B, if Γ; γ, β $ A for each β P SC, then ∆; γ,C $ A.
Now consider these cases.
‚ B :“ B1 ^ B2. Then for each δ P SB, δ “ δ1 Y δ2, where δi P SBi. So by
assumption, Γ; γ, β1, β2 $ A for each βi P SBi (since γ, β1, β2 denotes the
set γ Y β1 Y β2). So by hypothesis, Γ; γ, β1, B2 $ A for each β1 P SB1, and
so again by hypothesis, Γ; γ,B1, B2 $ A. Then by (^l), Γ; γ,B1^B2 $ A.
‚ B :“ B1 _ B2. Then SB1 Ď SB and SB2 Ď SB. So by hypothesis,
Γ; γ,B1 $ A and Γ; γ,B2 $ A and, by (_l), Γ; γ,B1 _B2 $ A.
‚ The B :“  pB1 _ B2q and B :“  pB1 ^ B2q cases are similar to the
cases above (respectively), and the B :“   B1 case is trivial, given that
Sp  B1q “ SB1.
%
Theorem 9.6 (Completeness). If Γ ( A then ttBu | B P Γu $ A.
Proof. Given our compactness theorem 5.2, we may focus on the case in
which Γ is finite: let Γ “ tB1, . . . , Bn}. So assume Γ ( A. They by the char-
acterisation theorem, for every X P SΓ, some y P SA fits X. So by lemma 9.4,
X $ A, for each X P SΓ. Each such X has the form ttβ1u, . . . , tβnuu, where
each βi P SBi. In the sequent notation, this is notated: β1; . . . ;βn. And by
definition of SΓ, there is such a set X for each βi P SBi and each i ď n. So
we have β1; . . . ;βn $ A, for each βi P SBi, for each i ď n. So by lemma 9.5
(applied n times), we have B1; . . . ;Bn $ A, which is equivalent notation for
ttB1u, . . . , tBnuu $ A. %
Theorem 9.7 (Cut-elimination). If Γ $ γ is derivable, then it is derivable
without any instances of (cut).
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Proof. We note that the completeness proof (9.6) does not make use of any
instances of (cut). So the system without (cut) is sound and complete wrt (,
and hence is equivalent to the system with (cut). %
We are unsure of the significance of cut-elimination in this system. In general,
the possibility of cut-elimination is important for proof search techniques, since
(cut) is typically the only rule in which a formula vanishes completely from
upper to lower sequent (which makes proof search impossible). In the present
system, however, the rule (,2) also contains a formula in an upper sequent which
may vanish in the lower sequent. So even cut-free proofs in this system may
lack the subformula property. We suspect, but have no proof, that (,2) is not
eliminable from the system.
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